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1

Case N o . 20080785-CA
IN THE

U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
BRANDON MICHAEL GIBBONS,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West Supp. 2008).l This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err by not making a relevance and accuracy
determination on the record regarding alleged inaccuracies in the pre-sentence
investigation report.

Unless otherwise indicated, citation to any statute is to the current
version, or West Supp. 2008-2009.

Standard of Review. A trial court's compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 7718-l(6)(a) is reviewed for correctness. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ^ 13, 6 P.3d
1133.
2. Did the trial court plainly err by not making a sentencing statement
before imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term for aggravated
kidnapping?
Standard of Review. Because this issue is raised for the first time on appeal
it is reviewed for plain error. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, f 19,192 P.3d 867.
3. Did the trial court plainly err by not ruling that the presumptive
fifteen-years-to-life term violates the state and federal constitutions?
Standard of Review. The standard of review is the same as that set forth
above.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Copies of the following statutes are attached in addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony, one count of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony,
and one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. Rl-3.
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Plea Agreement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to
one count of aggravated kidnapping.

R59-66.

The other charges were

dismissed, and the State agreed to not file a second aggravated robbery case
against defendant. Id.; see also R67-68.
Sentence. Defendant was sentenced to the presumptive statutory term of
"not less than 15 years and which may be for life." R80-81; R90:ll; see Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3)(a); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(4).
Notice of Appeal. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R86-87.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
While brandishing a broken glass bottle, defendant approached victim,
Alana Heaps, in a grocery store parking lot. R2. Defendant held the broken
bottle to Heaps' stomach and looked through her wallet. Id.; PSI-2 at 2, 4. He
found a bankcard to America First Credit Union. PSI-2 at 4. Defendant forced
Heaps back into her car while he got into the back seat and held a black metal
2

Because defendant pled guilty and the preliminary hearing was waived,
the fact statement is taken from the Information (Rl-3), the Statement of
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea (R59-66), and the Pre-Sentence
Investigation. The Pre-Sentence Investigation consists of two reports, neither of
which is numbered in the record. The first report, dated 28 April 2008, is titled
'Tost Sentence Report" and will be referred to as "PSI-1." It was prepared for
another conviction, but after the commission of the current offense. The second
report, dated 14 August 2008, is titled "Presentence Addendum Report" and
will be referred to as "PSI-2." It was prepared before sentencing for the current
offense and supplements PSI-1.
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object, which she thought was a gun, to the back of her neck. R2; PSI-2 at 2.
Defendant forced Heaps to drive him from the grocery store parking lot in Salt
Lake City to an address he gave her for an America First Credit Union ATM in
Sandy. Id.; PSI-2 at 2,4. Once at the ATM, defendant forced Heaps to withdraw
forty dollars and then drive him away. R2. Defendant mentioned having Heaps
drive him to meet a friend, but he instead got out of her car a short time later.
Id.; PSI-2 at 2, 5. Heaps immediately reported the crime and defendant was
arrested at the 9000 South Trax Station by a Sandy Police Officer. R. 3. After the
kidnapping, Heaps found cuts and scratches on her stomach where defendant
stuck her with the broken bottle. Id. These injuries were photographed at the
police station. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial court erred in not resolving alleged inaccuracies in
the PSI on the record. However, because the trial court's error did not affect
the sentencing recommendation or the trial court's imposition of the
presumptive statutory term, defendant's sentence should not be vacated.
The case should be remanded solely to allow the trial court to resolve the
alleged inaccuracies on the record.
Point II. Defendant did not challenge the trial court's failure to give a
sentencing statement upon imposing the presumptive statutory term of
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fifteen years to life. He has thus forfeited this claim on appeal. This Court
may not address this claim under either rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or the plain error doctrine. Rule 22(e) does not excuse
defendant's failure to preserve his claim because the trial court had proper
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, and because the presumptive term was
within the range authorized by the aggravated kidnapping statute. The plain
error doctrine does not excuse defendant's failure to preserve this issue
because defendant has not shown, and cannot show, that any possible error
should have been obvious to the trial court. No controlling statute or case
authority requires the trial court to make a sentencing statement before
imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. Because there is no
settled law requiring a sentencing statement in this circumstance, defendant
fails to show any error, let alone obvious error. Defendant's plain error claim
must therefore be rejected.
Ft• iilit I! L Defendant did not challenge the state or federal
constitutionality of the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term in the trial
court; therefore, this claim is also forfeited on appeal. The plain error
doctrine does not excuse defendant's forfeiture because, as before, he has not
shown, and cannot show, that the term's alleged unconstitutionality should
have been obvious to the trial court. There is no controlling statute or settled

case law stating that a fif teen-years-to-life term for an aggravated kidnapping
that does not involve serious physical injury or death is unconstitutional.
Defendant's plain error claim must therefore be rejected.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT MAKING A RELEVANCE
AND ACCURACY DETERMINATION ON THE RECORD
REGARDING ALLEGED INACCURACIES IN THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT.
In Point I of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court failed to correct
two alleged inaccuracies in PSI-2 on the record. Appellant's Br. at 9-12. In Point
II of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court consequently relied on
irrelevant and inaccurate information and his sentence should therefore be
overturned. Appellant's Br. at 12-18. Although the State concedes that it was
error for the judge not to make an accuracy and relevancy finding on the record,
the error did not affect the sentencing recommendation, or the trial court's
imposition of the presumptive statutory term. Therefore, this case should be
remanded for an appropriate accuracy and relevancy finding on the record, but
defendant's sentence should not be vacated. At most, defendant is entitled to
have the trial court re-evaluate his sentence, once it has resolved the alleged
inaccuracies on the record.

-6-

A. Proceedings Below.
Pre-sentence Im estigation. The following evidence was adduced from
the pre-sentence investigation. Defendant scored as a "High risk" offender,
meaning he had a high likelihood of re-offending. PSI-2 at 2. Areas of concern
included defendant's "criminal history, employment status and history,
financial situation, leisure time, companions, substance abuse history, and his
mental health history/' Id. Defendant had several prior convictions, including
two class A misdemeanors and three class B misdemeanors. See PSI-1 at 3.
Defendant also had several arrests, including three third-degree felonies and
multiple misdemeanors and infractions. See id.
Although several family members and family friends wrote to the trial
court on defendant's behalf, no family member was willing to allow defendant
to live with them. PSI-2 at 5; see R. 71-78. Defendant had no monthly income
and was fired from the only job he has ever had because he tested positive for
drugs while on probation. PSI-1 at 4-5. Defendant also has a recurring drug
problem that has "increased in severity over time and the defendant has stated
his drug problem has led to law violations, family problems, employment
problems, financial problems and medical problems all within the past year."
Id. at 5-6.

As a result of an unrelated conviction for attempted illegal drug
possession, defendant has previously completed an in-jail drug rehabilitation
program called CATS. Id. at 4. After completing the in-jail portion, defendant
was released on probation, during which he attended a CATS aftercare program
and held a job. Id. However, while still on probation, defendant tested positive
for heroin. Id. Adult Probation & Parole was contacted and a warrant was
issued for defendant's arrest in November 2007, but defendant absconded from
AP&P custody. Id. Defendant was not apprehended until February 22, 2008,
when he was arrested on the instant kidnapping charge. Id. Defendant's former
employer said that defendant is as smart as a "rocket scientist/' but that
"defendant uses his intelligence to try and beat the system any way he can."
PSI-1 at 6.
The PSI-2 used a sentencing matrix to calculate a sentencing
recommendation for defendant in this case. The sentencing matrix assigns
points for various factors. The points fall into a point range. This point range is
paired with the category of crime committed. Using a chart to map the point
range and crime category, a sentencing recommendation is reached. See PSI-2 at
Form 1.
Defendant scored eleven points on his sentencing matrix. PSI-2 at Form 1,
*1. However, this inaccurately included two points for a prior felony conviction,

-8-

which defendant did not have. See PSI-1 at 3; R. 90:3. Defendant's score,
therefore, should have been nine. However, either score —nine or eleven —
places defendant into the sentencing matrix point range of eight to eleven. See
PSI-2 at Form 1, *2.
A score of eight to eleven falls into row III of the sentencing matrix. PSI-2
at Form 1, *2. Defendant's admitted crime, a first-degree felony against a
person, falls into crime category C. See Id. Using the chart in the Sentencing
Matrix, a row III, category C offense has a suggested prison term of eight years.
See id.
Sentencing Hearing. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel brought
two alleged inaccuracies in PSI-2 to the trial court's attention. R90:3-4. Defense
counsel first noted the error explained above, that the sentencing matrix
incorrectly added points for a prior felony conviction, resulting in a score of two
for that category and a total score of eleven. R90:33; see PSI-2 at Form 1, *1.
Defense counsel asserted that this was inaccurate and handed to the judge a
copy of PSI-1, which correctly accounted for defendant's criminal history. R90:3;
see PSI-1 at 3. Defense counsel explained, "[a]s you can see from the attached
pre-sentence report out of Judge Roth's court, [defendant] has no prior felony

3

A copy of the sentencing transcript is included in addendum A.

.9-

convictions and, therefore, he scores a zero in that category. . . . and his total
score [should have been] nine." Id.
Turning to the second alleged inaccuracy, defense counsel directed the
trial court's attention to victim Alana Heaps' statement in PSI-2. R90:4. Defense
counsel alleged that Heaps' statement was inaccurate because she suggested
defendant was "somehow . . . proud about this misdemeanor case out of Judge
Roth's court." R90:4. Heaps' actual statement was that "[Defendant] prided
himself on the fact that he had pled a felony down to a misdemeanor." PSI-2 at
4. Defense counsel did not challenge the accuracy of the PSI's relation of Heaps'
statement, only her interpretation of defendant's statements. R90:4. Defense
counsel alleged that defendant was not proud about pleading down a felony to
a misdemeanor, but that he was proud of completing the CATS program and
beginning CATS aftercare: "[T]hat's the only concept that [defendant] was
trying to convey to [the pre-sentence investigator] which, unfortunately, in his
communications with the named victim somehow got misconstrued."

Id.

Having brought the alleged inaccuracies to the trial court's attention, defense
counsel stated, "Your Honor, with those two corrections in place . . .," and
continued on to another topic. R90:4.
Thereafter, Heaps addressed the trial court, making a victim impact
statement ("VIS"). See R90:9-10. Heaps stated that she was "a little bit bothered
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by the idea of just having a six to life term after what [she had gone] through
that day/' R90:9. Heaps explained how defendant's misconduct had affected
her, stating that she "honestly didn't think that [she] was going to live after
[they] picked up his friend. . . . It was a horrible day." R90:9-10. She further
noted that she works at the Federal Courthouse where she has "to talk to people
every day in the front lobby," and that she has trouble "doing [that] now."
R90:9. Heaps continued,
I have a really hard time thinking that there was three charges,
pleading to one. The reason he pled to that one is because I didn't
agree — I said we'll go to trial if he doesn't plead to that one. That's
the main thing that happened
I care that I had to sit and look at
the clock and think that I'm supposed to pick my babies up from
daycare in an hour and I'm not ever going to see them again. So I
think 15 to life is not asking a whole lot. And I think within that 15
years, or however long, he can get all the treatment that he needs.
And he can maybe sit there and think what it's like to wonder if
you're going to die in the next five minutes or not.

When Heaps finished, the judge asked defense counsel, "anything else?"
Id. Defense counsel made no objections to Heaps' statement, but did assert that,
" [defendant's] intent was not to harm in any way, shape or form." Id. The court
responded, "Well, she didn't know that." R90:ll. Defense counsel replied, "I
know. But the reality is he didn't threaten to take a life." Id. The court trial
pointed out," [t]hat's not the d e a l . . . [i]t's what was in her mind, not his mind..
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. . I don't think he needed to say I'm going to kill you. It was the way she was
receiving what he was doing. . . . I'm glad she came in because it makes a big
difference to me." Id.
The trial court imposed the presumptive statutory term of fifteen years to
life. Id.; R80-81.
B.

The trial court's failure to make a relevancy and accuracy
determination on the record was error.
The trial court is required to resolve inaccuracies in a PSI: "Any alleged

inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been
resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought
to the attention of the sentencing judge, and . . . the court sliall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record." Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(6)(a) (emphasis added). As the statute states, once alleged inaccuracies in the
PSI have been brought to the sentencing judge's attention, the judge has a duty
to "make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record." Id. The
Utah Supreme Court explained the sentencing judge's duty in State v. Jaeger:
"the sentencing judge [must] consider the party's objections to the report, make
findings on the record as to whether the information objected to is accurate, and
determine on the record whether that information is relevant to the issue of
sentencing." 1999 UT 1, Tf 44, 973 P.2d 404. "It is insufficient to make general

statements 'concerning the court's view of the defendant and the case/" State v.
Kohl 2000 UT 35, | 33, 999 P.2d 7 (quoting Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 44).
As noted, defense counsel raised two alleged inaccuracies in the PSI-2:
first, that the sentencing matrix incorrectly added two points for a prior felony
conviction when defendant did not have any prior felony conviction; and
second, that Heaps' statement incorrectly described defendant as being proud of
pleading down a felony to a misdemeanor. R9Q:3-4. The trial court did not
make a finding on the record regarding either of the alleged inaccuracies. See id.
Therefore, the sentencing judge failed to comply with the requirements of the
statute. As will be discussed below, however, the error did not affect the
sentencing recommendation and the sentence should not therefore be vacated.
Rather, the case should be remanded for a relevance and accuracy determination
on the record. See Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^f 44-45 (where alleged inaccuracies in PSI
do not affect sentence, "proper remedy is to remand [the] case to the trial court
with instructions that it expressly resolve [the] objections in full compliance with
section 77-18-l(6)(a)").
C. The trial court's failure to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the
presentence investigation report did not affect defendant's
sentence.
Contrary to defendant's assertions in Point II of his brief, the trial court's
failure to resolve alleged inaccuracies in PSI-2 on the record did not affect the
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imposition of the presumptive statutory term. Indeed, whether or not the
alleged inaccuracies are true, there is no evidence that the trial court relied on
either alleged inaccuracy in imposing sentence here.
1. Trial courts are given wide latitude in sentencing.
The alleged inaccuracies raised by defendant can be "described as
ordinary or 'run-of-the-mill' errors regularly reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." See State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App
9, ^f 15, 84 P.3d 854.

Tlierefore, a trial court is given "wide latitude in

sentencing" and a sentence will be vacated only if there has been an abuse of the
judge's discretion. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 66, 52 P.3d 1210. A trial court
abuses its discretion when "it fails to consider all legally relevant factors," such
as mitigating and aggravating circumstances, or if the sentence exceeds
statutory limits. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v.
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990), quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d
1133,1135 (Utah 1989)). As will be shown, the record reflects that the trial court
considered all legally relevant factors, and that the sentence does not exceed
statutory limits.
Here, the trial court was made aware of the alleged discrepancies between
PSI-1 and PSI-2. See R90:3-4. Defense counsel argued that PSI-2 inaccurately
gave defendant points for a prior felony conviction that did not exist. R90:3. He
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also argued that Heaps' statement in PSI-2 inaccurately described defendant as
being proud of pleading a felony down to a misdemeanor.

R90:4.

After

bringing the alleged inaccuracies to the trial court's attention, defense counsel
effectively acknowledged their informal resolution by stating, "Your Honor,
with those two corrections in place . . .," and then continuing on to another
topic. Id. If defense counsel was truly worried that the trial court had not
understood the inaccuracies or had not accepted his arguments, his statements
at the hearing failed to reflect such. Id. The record does not therefore support
defendant's claim on appeal, that the trial court relied on the alleged inaccurate
information in imposing sentence. Cf. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 11 (noting defendant
has burden to show trial court failed to consider proper factors in imposing
consecutive sentence).
Moreover, the record supports that the trial court properly considered
legally relevant factors before imposing the presumptive statutory term. PSI-1
and PSI-2, including Heaps' victim impact statement, were replete with
aggravating circumstances, e.g., defendant's history of drug abuse, criminality,
and lack of employment and family involvement. See PSI-2 at 2-5. Further, the
pre-sentence investigator specifically concluded that" [defendant] presented] a
serious threat of violent behavior," and that "defendant's actions posed a
serious threat to public safety." PSI-2 at Form 4, *1.
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On the other hand, PSI-2 did not specifically enumerate any mitigating
circumstances. PSI-2 at Form 4, *2. While defendant had letters of support, no
family member was willing allow him to live with them. PSI-2 at 5. In fact,
when defendant had no place to go in the middle of winter, his family forced
him to live in a tent instead of allowing him to sleep in their home. R73.
Nevertheless, defense counsel asserted several mitigating circumstances at the
sentencing hearing, including family and community support letters (however
equivocal that support), defendant's alleged remorse and guilty plea, and his
good behavior before abusing drugs. R90:4-7.
Notwithstanding the trial court's consideration of these proper factors
and arguments, defendant speculates that the trial court improperly relied upon
the alleged inaccuracies or irrelevant information in sentencing him.

See

Appellant's Br. at 12-18. However, even if it were reasonable to assume that the
trial court considered the allegedly inaccurate and irrelevant information, as
defendant contends, it is just as reasonable to assume that the trial court
considered the above relevant information.

Those legally relevant factors

support the sentence imposed, even if the trial court might have also considered
the alleged irrelevant information. The record thus fails to reflect any abuse of
the trial court's broad sentencing discretion.
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2. Defendant's sentence is not inherently unfair or clearly
excessive.
But even assuming that the trial court did rely on the alleged inaccurate
information, defendant's sentence is within the limits set by law.

An

indeterminate term of fifteen years to life is the presumptive statutory sentence
for aggravated kidnapping. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3)(a). The statute
provides for deviation from the presumptive sentence only in particular
circumstances. In its discretion, a trial court may adjust the sentence up to life
without parole if there are specific aggravating factors, see Utah Code Ann. § 765-302(3) (b), (c), or down to a term of either ten-years-to-life or six-years-to-life if
it is in the interests of justice, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(4) (a), (b).
Considering the balance of aggravating to mitigating circumstances here,
it was not an abuse of the judge's discretion to apply the presumptive fifteenyear term. Indeed, a trial court should only deviate from the presumptive
aggravated kidnapping sentence if it is in the interests of justice. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-302(4). As shown, "the judge was sufficiently apprised of the
pertinent background facts concerning the defendant to impose sentence/ 7 State
v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1067,1068 (Utah 1989). Moreover, defendant fell in the same
point range of eight to eleven regardless of whether he scored a nine or an
eleven on his sentencing matrix. See PSI-2 at Form 1, *2. Either way, the
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recommended term would have been eight years. See id. Therefore, imposing
the requested six-years-to-life term requested by defendant would have been
contrary to the sentencing recommendation, and would have also ignored the
significant factors of defendant's threat to public safety, history of drug abuse
and addiction, escalating criminality, inability to maintain employment, and
token familial support. Therefore, deviating from the presumptive term would,
on this record, be a disservice to the interests of justice. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-302(4). Defendant's sentence is fair and proportionate to the crime, and
should therefore be upheld.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT
MAKING A SENTENCING STATEMENT BEFORE IMPOSING
THE PRESUMPTIVE FIFTEEN-YEARS-TO-LIFE TERM FOR
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING.
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by not
giving a sentencing statement detailing the reasons for imposing the
presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. Appellant's Br. at 18-29. Alternatively,
defendant asserts that if his claim is unpreserved, the trial court's alleged error
in failing to give a sentencing statement should be addressed under 1) rule 22(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or 2) the plain error doctrine. Appellant's Br.
at 3-4. Defendant's claim should be rejected because it is unpreserved, and
because his failure to preserve is not excused by rule 22(e) or plain error.
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A,

Defendant failed to preserve a specific challenge to the trial
court's failure to give a sentencing statement.
An appellate court will not consider claims raised for the first time on

appeal. State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 33,122 P.3d 543; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
If 11,10 P.3d 346; State v. Tillman, 750 R2d 546,551 (Utah 1987). Here, defendant
did not preserve a challenge to the lack of a sentencing statement and, therefore,
forfeited any appellate review. State v. Snyder, 74:7 P.2d 417,421 (Utah 1987).
Defendant's assertion of error for the first time on appeal is inconsistent
with Utah's contemporary preservation rule. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942,
947 (Utah 1982) (//TThis is clearly a case where a timely and specific objection
would have afforded the trial court the opportunity to address [the defendant]'s
concerns/'). Utah courts require timely and specific objections "in order 'to
bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,
361 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11 (" [T]he
trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if
appropriate, correct it") (quotation and citation omitted). "Accordingly, an
objection 'must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial
[court] can consider it.'" Cruz, 2005 UT 45, If 33 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361).
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Here, defendant asked the trial court to impose a sentence of six-years-tolife, and alleged some minimal mitigating circumstances. See R. 90:4-8. When
the trial court imposed the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term, defendant
raised no objection, let alone an objection that the trial court had failed to make a
sentencing statement. See R90:ll. Defendant never asserted that the trial court
had failed to consider the mitigating circumstances presented during the
sentencing hearing. See id.
Defendant's request that the trial court consider mitigating circumstances
and impose a lesser sentence of six-years-to-life was insufficient to alert the trial
court to the defendant's claim on appeal, that it was required to make a
sentencing statement on the record before imposing the presumptive term.
Defendant's claim should therefore be rejected.
B.

Neither rule 22(e), nor the plain error doctrine excuse
defendant's failure to preserve his claim.
As for defendant's alternative reliance on rule 22(e), and the plain error

doctrine, they do not apply here.
1. Defendant's reliance on rule 22(e) is misplaced.
"The purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of manifestly illegal
sentences" at any time. State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5, 48 P.3d 228. It is not
intended to be an exception to general rules of preservation. Consequently,
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claims under rule 22(e) "must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse." Id.
To fit within a "narrowly circumscribed" illegal sentence claim, the sentence
must be "patently," State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995), or
"manifestly," Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5 n.l, illegal. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^
15. "A 'patently' or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally occurs in one of two
situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." Thorkelson, 2004 UT A p p 9,
^f 15 (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, jf 5 n.l). Neither of these situations exists here:
the sentencing court had proper jurisdiction and the sentence was within the
range authorized by statute. Indeed the sentence is the presumptive term for
aggravated kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3)(a).
2. Defendant has not shown, and cannot show, plain error.
For relief under the plain error doctrine, defendant must show that "(i)
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for [defendant]." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208
(Utah 1993). If any one of these prongs is unmet, the others need not be
addressed. Cf State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993).
Here, defendant's claim of plain error fails under the first two prongs. He
cannot show that the trial court erred, let alone plainly erred, because the
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aggravated kidnapping statute does not require a trial court to explain its
imposition of the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-302(3). Rather, the aggravated kidnapping statute requires a trial court to
make a sentencing statement only if it "finds that a lesser term than [the
presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term] is in the interests of justice/ 7 Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-302(4).4 Then, and only then, must the trial court "state[ ] the
reasons for this finding on the record[.]" Id. The aggravated kidnapping statute
does not, therefore, require the trial court to make a sentencing statement before
imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5302(3).
Moreover, defendant cites no Utah case authority, and the State is aware
of none, which requires the trial court to make a sentencing statement before
imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term under the aggravated
kidnapping statute. See Appellant's Br. at 18-29. "Utah courts have repeatedly
held that a trial court's [alleged] error is not plain where there is no settled
appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah
App. 1997). Accordingly, defendant has not and cannot show that it should

4

The aggravated kidnapping statute also authorizes a term of life without
parole where there are specific aggravating factors not present here. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3)(b)-(c).

-??-

have been obvious to the trial court that it was required to make a sentencing
statement before

imposing the presumptive

fifteen-years-to-life

term.

Defendant's plain error claim must therefore be rejected. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1208; Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61; Ross, 951 P.2d at 239.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT RULING
THAT THE PRESUMPTIVE FIFTEEN-YEARS-TO-LIFE TERM
VIOLATES THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
In Point IV of his brief, defendant asserts that the aggravated kidnapping
sentencing scheme violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment, and its state counterpart in article I, section 9 of the Utah
Constitution. Appellant's Br. at 29-30. Specifically, defendant asserts that
imposition of the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term was unconstitutional
because the aggravated kidnapping here, "while admittedly quite serious did
not involve death or physical injury/' Apellant's Br. at 30. Acknowledging that
this issue is unpreserved, defendant asks the Court to review it under the plain
error doctrine. Appellant's Br. at 4.
Here, defendant's plain error claim fails as a matter of law because he
cannot show obvious error. No possible error in imposing the presumptive
fifteen-years-to-life term could have been obvious to the trial court because there
is no settled appellate law stating that a fifteen-years-to-life term for an

aggravated kidnapping that does not involve serious physical injury or death is
unconstitutional. Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. Defendant cites no such authority, and
the State is aware of none. Indeed, defendant's claim of cruel and unusual
punishment, on these facts, borders on the frivolous. See, e.g., Euring v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 28-30 (2003) (citation omitted) (rejecting Eighth Amendment
challenge to Ewing's "three strikes sentence of 25 years to life" for "offense of
'shoplifting three golf clubs'"); United States v. Angelas, 433 F.3d 738,750-53 (10th
Cir.) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 55 year prison sentence
mandated for Angelos's conviction on three separate offenses of possession of a
firearm in connection with a drug offense), cert, denied, 549 U.S. 1077 (2006).
Defendant's plain error claim must therefore be rejected. Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1208; Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61; Ross, 951 P.2d at 239.5

5

Notably, defendant, who is represented by the same firm that
represented him below, does not claim ineffective assistance of counsel in
conjunction with any of his claims of plain error. Because an error that should
have been obvious to the trial court, should have also been obvious to defense
counsel, claims of plain error are typically raised together with claims of
ineffectiveness. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906-07 (Utah App. 1994),
vacated on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court
affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court, but remand the case for the
limited purpose of resolving the accuracy and relevancy of challenged
information in the PSI.
Respectfully submitted _ L April 2009.
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PROCEEDINGS
*

THE COURT:

•

*

Your Honor, this is Brandon Gibbons.

Mike Peterson representing him.
THE COURT:

Did I get appearances?

MS. COLLINS:

Chou Chou Collins for the State.

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, do you have the

pre-sentence report in this case?
THE COURT:

I do.

MR. PETERSON:
matters.

Your Honor, I need to correct two

First, on form one in the report, the addendum at the

end, the score that the AP&P agent has indicated of 11 is
incorrect because they list a score of two for prior felony
convictions.

As you can see from the attached pre-sentence

report out of Judge Roth's court, Mr. Gibbons has no prior
felony convictions and, therefore, he scores a zero in that
category.
THE COURT:

Unfortunately, I didn't get an

attachment.
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, if I may approach?

It's

just the brief class A misdemeanor report out of Judge Roth's
court.

It's plain from that attachment that Mr. Gibbons has no

prior felony record and, therefore, has a zero in that category
and his total score is nine.

3

The other thing I needed to correct was a
misperception that occurred when the pre-sentence report
writer, Nathan Eldridge, was communicating with the named
victim in this case.

On page four, the second paragraph from

the bottom, there was some indication that Mr. Gibbons had
somehow been proud about this misdemeanor case out of Judge
Roth T s court.

What I want to clarify there is this, your

Honor, he wasn' t proud about pleadincr a third decrree down to a
class A.

In fact, that was just a standard offer for a

possession case.

What he expressed to the agent was that he

took some measure of satisfaction and pride in the fact that he
completed the CATS program and then was beginning the CATS
after care.

And that's the only concept that he was trying to

convey to Nathan Eldridge which, unfortunately, in his
communications with the named victim somehow got misconstrued
about being proud that he got a class A off of a third, or
something along those lines.
Your Honor, with those two corrections in place as
you know from the outset when we entered this plea we come
before you, number one, on a mandatory prison case.

The issue

for the Court today is six to life, ten to life, or 15 to life.
We're asking the Court to please look at the option of a six to
life commitment here, because this is a first felony offense
for Mr. Gibbons, albeit very serious.

But also because, Judge,

as you can see from the pre-sentence report that you have, and
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the one from Judge Roth T s court, and from the outpouring of
family and community support letters that you received in this
case, Mr. Gibbons obviously has a long standing, problematic,
troubling history with substance abuse.
And he thought that he had gotten that somewhat well
in check going through the Judge Roth case, getting the CATS
program done, the after care.
obvious relapse.

But, unfortunately, there was an

Mr. Gibbons freely acknowledges in his

statement to the Court in this report that he had been using
for a significant period, even while on Judge Roth's class A
probation, that he had become dope sick, that he had called
home to try and get some money.

That didn't work out.

And that in this sort of dope sick desperation he
found a broken bottle in a parking lot area and held it up to
this named victim.

I want to reiterate something I said at the

time of the change of plea, Judge, and that is that Mr. Gibbons
in no way, shape, or form minimizes how serious this conduct
is, and how tremendously traumatic this was to Alana Heaps, and
the kind of psychological difficulty he has caused her.

He

realizes this is going to take significant counseling and other
forms of assistance in her life.
He wants the Court to know, the State and Ms. Heaps
to know how awful he feels about that conduct.

His intention,

Judge, was basically to get her between the bottle and the car
and see if he could get $40 or $50 from her wallet.

That was

5

the idea, but what ended up happening was he ordered her into
the car.

Realizing there was no cash in the wallet, he then

ordered her to drive out to an ATM.
He admits he looked through the wallet, Judge, found
an ATM card, realized what branch it was to and said, okay,
this is where we're driving to.

AP&P suggests in one sentence

in this report that Mr. Gibbons really truly didn't take
responsibility or proper remorse for this case, but I beg to
differ significantly.

Because when he entered his plea, he

plead to a mandatory imprisonment case.
knew could carry 15 to life.

He plead to a case he

He did not force this case into a

trial when some other clients in other states of denial may
have.

He took a very tough plea bargain.

Ms. Collins will be

the first to admit that he took a tough plea deal here,
subjecting himself to a long stretch in prison.
But what he did not do ever, was ever deny the
essential facts of what he did to Ms. Heaps.
time that I was his lawyer onwards.

At least from the

He may have said something

initially to a detective that wasn't straightforward, but from
the day he and I were engaged in this case through the court
system he has fully acknowledged what he has done.

He has

always said let's plea bargain this for the best offer that we
can get, and that's what we did.

So, Judge, I think on balance

when you look at the family and friends' support letters, and
I've probably given you a migraine, I just kept sending them to
6

you every other day as they came in.

They talk about Brandon

Gibbons who grew up in a safe, structured middle class
environment where he excelled in his church activities, where
he excelled in his scouting activities.

And then,

unfortunately, around 16 or so he fell in with a different
group and he started using.

And a couple of the wheels have

flown off since then and he's battled this addition for some
period of time.
But fundamentally what these letters talk about is a
very caring and kind, compassionate human being who, when he is
not under the influence or drug seeking, doesn't do anything
remotely like this.
past.

He does not have crimes of violence in his

So I'm asking the Court to put Mr. Gibbons in a position

with the Board of Pardons with a six to life where they have
all the options available to them, depending on what he does to
prove himself inside the system.
If you look at his matrix, Judge, he scores at an
eight year time frame for parole eligibility.
question

There's no

—
THE COURT:

Let me ask you this though, wasn't he on

parole at the time?
MR. PETERSON:

He was not.

He was on probation to

Judge Roth on a class A after completing CATS inpatient
THE COURT:

So he wasn't a fugitive.

—

Well, it says

he was a fugitive.
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MR. PETERSON:

He had absconded from his AP&P

probation, but it was on a class A misdemeanor.

The reason

you're looking at him right now, your Honor, in a prison suit
is because when he went to the order to show cause with Judge
Roth, he told the judge I will do my year in the prison.

The

reason he told Judge Roth that, over Ms. Stamfs objection, was
that he knew this case was coming.

And he knew he was going to

prison on this case, so he got out there to start his
treatment.

And the good news is, Judge, he is now in a wing of

the prison where he's doing just that.

He's engaging in active

treatment for his issues.
But back to my point.

With the matrix suggesting an

eight year date prior to parole consideration, I'm asking the
Court to impose the sentence in the six to life time frame
rather than the ten to life or 15 to life so then the Board
does have the maximum leverage and they don't feel like they're
handcuffed by this Court's sentence being ten to life or 15 to
life.

And if he were to prove himself the way I think that he

can in the kinds of programming, the Conquest drug program,
etcetera.

I appreciate Ms. Heaps will be appearing at his

parole hearings and will be speaking about the traumatic nature
of this event.

And fine, that's appropriate and sobeit.

But

at least then the Board has all of its ability to act and react
according to Ms. Heaps' input and to Mr. Gibbons track record.
THE COURT:

Ms. Collins.
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MS. COLLINS:

Your Honor, the victim is here and she

wishes to speak to the Court.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. COLLINS:

Will you have her come up?

Yes.

Your Honor, this is Elaine Heaps.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Go ahead.

MS. HEAPS:

I'm a little bit bothered by the idea of

just having a six to life term after what I went through that
day.

I mean, I have to sit and think about what if my babies

would have been in the back seat and I hadnf t been at work that
day?

Or when I was sitting on 90th South staring straight

across from a cop, and having him tell me to drive careful so
that we didnf t get picked up.

And I was trying to figure a way

to wreck the car so at least my body would get found that day,
because I honestly didn't think that I was going to live after
we picked up his friend, or whatever we were going to do.
And if it was all about just needing treatment, and
just wanting treatment or whatever, he could have asked me to
stop.

He had a thing from Odessey House on the front seat of

the car.

And I had hid everything else from my work there

because I thought that was going to make it worse.
could have asked me to take him to treatment.

But he

He wouldn' t have

got picked up.
He could have asked to go to the hospital.
offered him to go to the hospital.
what I need.

They

He said, they don't have

So I don't think that —

it doesn't feel like to
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me at all if it was about needing help and wanting help.
was a horrible day.

It

And I work at the Federal Courthouse.

I

have to talk to people every day in the front lobby, and I have
issues doing it now.

Smells make me almost sick.

Things are

just crazy.
I have a really hard time thinking that there was
three charges, pleading to one.

The reason he plead to that

one is because I didn't agree -- I said we'll go to trial if he
doesn't plead to that one.
happened.

That's the main thing that

I don't care about what he took from my ATM. I don't

care whatever else.
I care that I had to sit and look at the clock and
think that I'm supposed to pick my babies up from daycare in an
hour and I'm not ever going to see them again.
to life is not asking a whole lot.

So I think 15

And I think within that 15

years, or however long, he can get all the treatment that he
needs.

And he can maybe sit there and think what it's like to

wonder if you're going die in the next five minutes or not.
THE COURT:

Is that it?

MS. COLLINS:

Okay, thank you.

Your Honor, with what the victim just

said we will submit.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. PETERSON:

Mr. Peterson, anything else?

Judge, just that Mr. Gibbons intent

here was to get $40 or $50 to go get dope.

His intent was not

to harm in any way, shape or form.
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THE COURT:

Well, she didn't know that.

MR. PETERSON:

I know.

But the reality is he didn't

threaten to take a life.
THE COURT:

That's not the deal, Mr. Peterson.

It's

what was in her mind, not his mind.
MR. PETERSON:

I understand.

But I am suggesting

what was conveyed during that ride was not a risk of death.
THE COURT:
going to kill you.

Well, I don't think he needed to say I'm
It was the way she was receiving what he

was doing.
MR. PETERSON:

There's no doubt, Judge.

I'm not

trying to minimize that at all.
THE COURT:

And I'm glad she came in because it makes

a big difference to me.

I'm going to sentence him to an

indeterminate term of 15 years to life and take him forthwith.
(Whereupon the record was closed at 9:50 a.m.)
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-1
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
r
J Chapter 18. The Judgment
*^§ 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 . Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision-Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and c o n d i t i o n s Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring

(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in abeyance
agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in
Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement.
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or offense,
the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C
misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with the
department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as
ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all
individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall be
provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and
the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by
the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the supervision
and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the standards
based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and submit it to
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the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the probation
of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence
investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may
supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant,
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of
obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or information from other sources
about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to
guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the
victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages,
accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution with
interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include:
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under Section 77_1 8 - 1 . 1 ; and
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender.
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report
ordered by the court under Section.76-3-404/ are protected and are not available except by court
order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney,
or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three
working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report,
which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought
to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to
resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on
the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of
sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.

http://web2.westlawxom/result/documenttext.aspx?utid=2&fn=Jop&scxt=W

4/1/2009

UT ST § 76-5-302

.Page 1 ol I

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-302
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
K
bJ Chapter 5. Offenses Against the Person (Refs & Annos)
"bl Part 3. Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Smuggling
^ § 7 6 - 5 - 3 0 2 . Aggravated kidnapping

(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of committing unlawful
detention or kidnapping:
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1 ; or
(b) acts with intent:
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a third person
to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted
commission of a felony;
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony;
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses.
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping" means in
the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of a violation of:
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention.
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 years and which may be
for life;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that
during the course of the commission of the aggravated kidnapping the defendant caused serious
bodily injury to another; or
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the aggravated
kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense.
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds that a lesser term than
the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interests of justice and states the reasons for
this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b):
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(i) ten years and which may be for life; or
(ii) six years and which may be for life.
(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person Is sentenced under Subsection (3)
(c).
(6) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406.
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